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Long-distance Nationalism and Belonging in the Libyan Diaspora (1969-2011)   
The article explores the significance of the Libyan diaspora for the politics of the 
homeland and for nation-building in Libya before the 2011 revolution. The 
focus is on the migratory flows of Libyan nationals from Libya that resulted in 
the formation of the Libyan diaspora between 1969 and 2011. The historical 
analysis of the migratory flows, with a focus on long-distance nationalism 
projects enacted by opposition groups in exile, is combined with the empirical 
analysis of the micro interactional social mechanisms at work in the diaspora 
that suffuse the everyday lives of individuals. The historical and empirical 
analysis of the case of the Libyan diaspora provides an opportunity to unpack 
the mutually constitutive relationship between concepts of nation, nation-state, 
nationalism and belonging in the context of transnational processes in the 
twenty-first century. 
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Introduction  
Libyan exiles and immigrants across the world, both first and second generations, took part in 
the 2011 Libyan revolution since the early days. During and after the eight-month conflict, 
they joined transitional political institutions as members or advisers, fought the war against 
the regime, contributed to the humanitarian efforts of international organisations and NGOs, 
coordinated financial and operational support for humanitarian purposes, advocated for the 
revolution through peaceful protests, online websites, social media and newly established 
media outlets. The revolution de facto brought to the forefront of Libyan politics the Libyan 
diaspora raising questions about its role, nature and the processes through which it came into 
being before 2011.  
 This article intends to answer these questions by exploring the significance of the 
diaspora for the politics of the homeland and for nation-building in Libya before 2011. To do 
so, it starts by examining the migratory flows of Libyan nationals from Libya that resulted in 
the formation of the Libyan diaspora during the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, between 1969 
and 2011; a subject so far remained unexplored. The article, therefore, contributes to fill a gap 
in the literature by presenting a brief history of the formation of the Libyan diaspora.
 Furthermore, on the wake of studies on long-distance nationalism and diaspora 
nationalism by Anderson,1 Glick Shiller and Fouron,2 Jaffrelot and Therwath,3 Gal, Leoussi 
and Smith,4 Conversi5 and more recently by Callahan,6 Alain Dieckhoff7 and Bo Stråth8, the 
                                                 
1 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1983); Benedict Anderson, Long-Distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity 
Politics (Amsterdam: Centre for Asian Studies, 1992). 
2 Nina Glick Shiller and Georges Eugene Fouron, Georges Woke Up Laughing: Long-Distance Nationalism and 
the Search for Home (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001). 
3 Christophe Jaffrelot and Ingrid Therwath, ‘The Sangh Parivar and the Hindu Diaspora in the West: 
What Kind of ‘‘Long-Distance Nationalism’’?’, International Political Sociology (2007) 1, 278–295.  
4 Allon Gal, Athena S. Leoussi and Anthony D. Smith (eds), The Call of the Homeland, Diaspora Nationalisms, 
Past and Present (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2010).  
5 Daniele Conversi, ‘Irresponsible Radicalisation: Diasporas, Globalisation and Long-Distance  Nationalism in 
the Digital Age’, Journal of  Ethnic and Migration Studies, 38-9, 2012, 1357-1379. 
6 William Callahan, ‘Dreaming as a critical discourse of national belonging: China Dream, American Dream and 
world dream’, Nations and Nationalism, 23 (2), 2017, 248-270.  
7 Alan Dieckhoff, ‘The Jewish Diaspora and Israel: Belonging at Distance?’, Nations and Nationalism, 23 (2), 
2017, 271-288.   
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article adds to the discussion on the relevance of and interplay between the concepts of nation, 
nationalism, nation-state, diaspora, and belonging. Through the empirical analysis of the case 
of the Libyan diaspora, following in the footsteps of the research agenda suggested by 
Eleanor Knott,9 the article examines the mutually constitutive relationship between the 
concepts of belonging, nation and nationalism in the context of transnational processes. In so 
doing, it seeks to answer these questions: How is belonging conceived and constructed 
through the political projects of the Libyan opposition in exile and in the everyday life of 
individuals in the diaspora? How do such conceptions of belonging shape long-distance 
nationalism? How cohesive is long-distance nationalism and what is its impact on the politics 
of the homeland and on nation-building?  
 The article begins with a sketch of the key theoretical concepts and of the research 
methodology. A brief history of the migratory flows follows with a focus on four examples of 
long-distance nationalism enacted by political opposition groups in exile: the National Front 
for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), the Libyan 
Islamic Group and the National Conference for the Libyan Opposition. This section unveils 
the ways of conceiving of belonging and in turn constructing long-distance nationalist 
projects among these groups. A snapshot of the size, geography and nature of the diaspora at 
the onset of the 2011 revolution is included. 
 The following section shows how some practices in the diaspora, both within the 
communities of political dissidents but also in the a-political ones, fostered the reproduction 
of a Libyan social culture in the everyday life of individuals. In so doing, the article unveils 
the micro interactional social mechanisms10 at work in political and a-political communities, 
in the family, Libyan schools and social gatherings that contributed to shape a sense of 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 Bo Stråth, ‘Identity and social solidarity: an ignored connection. An historical perspecyive on the state of 
Euorpe and its nations’, Nations and Nationalism, 23 (2), 2017, 227-247. 
9 Eleanor Knott, ‘Nationalism and belonging: introduction’, Nations and Nationalism, 23 (2), 2017, 220-226.  
10 Sinisa Malešević, ‘The chimera of national identity’, Nations and Nationalism (2011) 17: 276-282.  
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belonging to the Libyan nation and groupness across multiple generations in the Libyan 
diaspora.  
 The article provides an historical and empirical analysis of the mutually constitutive 
relationship between long-distance nationalism, belonging and the nation-state. It 
demonstrates how political projects and micro interactional social mechanisms generated a 
sense of belonging to the Libyan nation among individuals in the diaspora that crystallised in 
a sense of groupness based on a powerfully imagined and strongly felt commonality and 
relational connectedness. Furthermore, the article reveals an understanding of the Libyan 
nation in the diaspora primarily as an ethnic and cultural community beyond the borders of 
the Libyan nation-state and across multiple generations. This demonstrates how the 
experience of the diaspora can not only strengthen ethnic identity but it can also contribute to 
construct it. In so doing, the article reaffirms the relevance of the nation and of the nation-
state in the twenty-first century.  
Key Concepts and Methodology 
This article is based on an interpretivist, inductive and qualitative approach, informed by the 
grounded theory method (GTM),11 to the study of nations, nationalism, belonging and 
diaspora. Following in the footsteps of the revisionists in social sciences who approach the 
study of groups in processual and relational terms,12 the nation is understood as 'a process 
under continual re-construction constituted among the pressures of historical events including 
immigration and racial and ethnic contests for power or equality'.13 Despite the salience of 
transnational migration among other transnational processes, the nation and the nation-state - 
understood as the territorial political unit whose borders correspond with the distribution in 
                                                 
11 Antony Bryant, ‘The Grounded Theory Method’, in The Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014).  
12 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, ‘Beyond Identity’, Theory and Society (2000) 29, 1: 1-47.  
13 Virginia Yans, ‘On Groupness’, Journal of American Ethnic History (2006) 25, 4: 119-129. 
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that territory of a national group-14 remain a central locus of belonging.15 Even post-national 
forms of belonging such as long-distance nationalism retain links to the nation and to the 
nation-state.16  
 Belonging is understood in dynamic, relational and processual terms17 as a concept 
‘actively lived’, ‘by being and doing’,18 while considering the impact and role of politics, 
distance, contingency and contestation.19 The nation is a strong form of belonging that 
provides a sense of ‘oneness’ and groupness to its members. Described as the sense of 
belonging to a distinctive, bounded solidary group, groupness is generated by commonality - 
shared common attributes (categories) – and connectedness – relational ties that link people 
(networks) – that allow for the emotional sense of belonging to a group or the felt difference 
from or antipathy to specified outsiders to emerge.20 By scrutinising the common attributes, 
both the civic and the ethnic ideas of nation, as well as the relational ties among people, one 
can observe how belonging is constructed ‘at home’ and in the diaspora through the political 
projects of the opposition in exile as well as in the everyday life of individuals. Therefore, the 
article combines an analysis of the work of political nation-builders in exile next to that of the 
social micro-processes of identification suffusing the life of individuals 21 that resulted in the 
sense of belonging to the Libyan nation in the diaspora. 
 A national diaspora is broadly defined as: 'a people with a common national origin 
who regard themselves, or are regarded by others, as members or potential members of the 
national community of their home nation, a status held regardless of their geographical 
                                                 
14 Walker Connor, ‘A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group is a ...’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1 (4), 
1978, 382.  
15 Rogers Brubaker, ‘Migration, membership, and the modern nation-state: internal and external dimensions of 
the politics of belonging’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 41 (1), 2010, 61–78, Knott, ‘Nationalism and 
belonging’; Glick Shiller and Fouron, ‘Georges Woke Up Laughing’, 30. 
16 Knott, ‘Nationalism and belonging’; Meyda Yeğenoğlu, ‘Cosmopolitanism and nationalism in a globalized 
world’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 28 (1), 2005, 103–131, 110.  
17 Brubaker and Cooper, ‘Beyond Identity’.  
18 Vanessa May, Connecting Self to Society: Belonging in a Changing World (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013).  
19 Knott, ‘Nationalism and belonging’.  
20 Brubaker and Cooper ,‘Beyond Identity’, 19-20. 
21 Yves Déloye, ‘National Identity and Everyday Life’, in Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 615.  
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location and citizenship status outside their national soil'.22 This article, by focusing on the 
active participants in the diaspora, intends to explore the mutually constitutive relationship 
between nationalism - understood as ‘a set of beliefs and practices that link together the 
people of a nation and its territory’23 - and belonging. In particular, long-distance nationalism 
is a form of nationalism from abroad that ‘binds together immigrants, their descendants, and 
those who have remained in their home-land into a single transborder citizenry’.24 Benedict 
Anderson, who coined the term, linked long-distance nationalism to intense political 
radicalisation and to the strengthening of ethnic identity in the diaspora.25 These hypotheses 
can be tested along the lines of studies undertaken by Dieckhoff and Conversi through an 
empirical study of long-distance nationalism in the Libyan diaspora.    
 The author's direct observation and participation in Libyan civil society between 
September 2013 and June 2014 provided an insight on the phenomenon of interest and a 
better view of what was relevant in that empirical area of study. During the following 
fieldwork in Cairo, Tunis and in the UK, between February and November 2016, thirty-nine 
semi-structured interviews were conducted applying purposive sampling and snowballing 
techniques to identify the interviewees.26 The main criterion in the selection of the 
interviewees was his/her active participation in politics or civil society before, during and/or 
after the revolution, ‘at home’ in Libya or in the diaspora, whether through political 
opposition in exile before 2011 or in transitional politics after 2011, through grassroots or 
online activism. In particular, by covering the period preceding the 2011 revolution, this 
article focuses on the political opposition to Muammar Gaddafi in the diaspora. The article 
                                                 
22 Yossi Shain, The Frontier of Loyalty (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989), 50. 
23 Glick Shiller and Fouron, ‘Georges Woke Up Laughing’, 17-18 
24 Glick-Schiller and Fouron, ‘Georges Woke Up Laughing’ , 20 
25 Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalisms, Southeast Asia, and the World (London: 
Verso, 1998), 74. 
26 Of these thirty-nine interviews, nine were with women. Four of them were members of the diaspora before 
2011 and at the time of the interview; two were based in Libya; three had left Libya after 2014 and remained 
outside the country at the time of the interview. With regard to men, out of thirty interviews, thirteen were 
conducted with members of the diaspora before 2011 and at the time of the interview; seven with interviewees 
based in Libya; ten with interviewees who had left Libya after 2014 and remained outside the country at the time 
of the interview.  
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does not address the community of loyalists in the diaspora before or after 2011 or that of 
economic migrants per se but rather focuses on the active diaspora participants who engaged 
at some level with politics or civil society before and during the 2011 revolution.27   
 The face-to-face and phone interviews conducted in English with members of the 
Libyan diaspora were divided in two parts. The first set of questions were aimed to unveil the 
demographics of the interviewee while starting to engage him/her with questions of 
nationality and language, reasons for and conditions of the dispersal and return, and their 
engagement with political, social or cultural activities oriented at Libya before, during and/or 
after the revolution. This form of open-ended questioning allowed the interviewee to narrate 
the story of his/her civil and political engagement, while bringing up his/her sense of 
belonging, as well as practices of everyday nationalism. The second part of the interview 
concerned ideas around the Libyan nation, roots, home and collective memory, as well as the 
question of agency and role of media and technology in the process of nation-building. The 
first line of questioning presented an opportunity to fill a gap in the literature around the 
political opposition of the Libyan diaspora by providing a descriptive historical narrative of 
the formation of the diaspora through the accounts of its active participants that is presented 
below.  
Migratory flows and long-distance nationalism under the Gaddafi regime (1969-2011)   
The Libyan diaspora in its pre-2011 configuration emerged from the political, economic and 
cultural revolution imposed on the Libyan people by the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. The 
1969 revolution resulted on the firm control of the regime over the country’s economic, 
political and social life and led to migratory flows and to the establishment of diverse Libyan 
                                                 
27 Out of the seventeen diaspora individuals interviewed, five were first generation migrants born in Libya; five 
were 1.5 generation migrants who were born in Libya but emigrated before or during their early teens; and seven 
were second generation migrants born outside Libya - for the definition of 1.5 generation migrants see Curt 
Asher and Emerson Case, ‘A generation in transition: A study of the usage and attitudes toward public libraries 
by generation 1.5 composition students’, Reference & User Services Quarterly, 47(3), 2008, 274-279. 
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communities across North America, Europe and the MENA region.28 Political dissidents 
across the entire political spectrum and citizens from different socio-economic backgrounds 
such as students in higher education, businessmen, and professionals came to constitute the 
Libyan diaspora. By the end of the 1970s, around 100,000 Libyans well educated and with 
degrees from western universities had left the country out of a population of about three 
million.29  
 As numbers of Libyan citizens abroad increased throughout the 1970s, so did the 
organization of the political opposition in exile. A dozen of political groups emerged that 
reflected diverse ideological leanings and the extreme fragmentation of the opposition.30 The 
National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), established on 6 October 1981, was the 
main opposition group in exile until it lost political and military traction as well as external 
backing in the 1990s.31 The Libyan ambassador to India, Mohamed Yusuf al-Magariaf 
defected in the summer of 1980 and recruited more than a thousand members in Egypt, 
Sudan, Morocco, Iraq, United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Tunisia, and inside Libya 
as well.  
 The founding declaration of the NFSL and the interviews with the members illustrate 
the relevance of nationalism as the dominant thin-centred ideology32 of the group in several 
instances. A member of the NFSL described the ideological agenda of the group in these 
terms: 
 It was nationalist but nationalist in the Libyan context. Basically, we are just Libyans, 
 we believe in our country, we are proud of our history, we are proud of our 
                                                 
28 Vandewalle, A history of modern Libya, 83-84. 
29 Ibid., 112; The World Bank, Libya-Population, total, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=LY (accessed July 14, 2018). 
30 Saskia Van Genugten, Libya in Western Foreign Policies, 1911-2011, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 
111.  
31 Ibid., 112.  
32 Michael Freeden, ‘Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?’, Political Studies, XLVI, 748-765.  
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 grandfathers and what they did. We talk about how they fought colonialism. So it is 
 that sense of patriotism and nationalism, these are the sentiments that motivated us.  
The nation, the Libyan nation and not the Arab one as the interviewee seems to imply in the 
first line, is the defining framework of the NFSL action combined with pride in the anti-
colonial struggle, observed in the nationalist ideology of other post-colonial nation-states, and 
the pre-Gaddafi history.  
 In the founding declaration, the NFSL is described as ‘a body to encourage and unite 
all Libyan national forces to further expose the destructive reality of Gaddafi's rule, to restore 
the national will’, a body belonging ‘to all Libyans regardless of their age, social status or 
outlook’.33 Therefore, belonging to the nation is understood as inclusive and pluralistic, at 
least in principle. 'Outlook' is interpreted to include different ethnic, political or ideological 
leanings but also different ways of practicing Islam. The daughter of a member of the NFSL 
observed that within the NFSL what mattered was being Libyan above membership to a 
minority ethnic group or provenance from a region:34  
 I mean the variety of Libyans that we knew were Berbers [Amazigh], people from the 
 West and people from the East. We were simply Libyans in [city X]. So we stayed 
 together, we had a lot of different interactions with one another. 
In describing the difference between the Libyan Islamic Group, an associate of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and the NFSL a member of the NFSL said:35  
 The MB [Muslim Brotherhood] are very ideological. They would only recruit and 
 allow people to join them if  they were religious and followed the same code of 
 practice but we said: ‘No, we are not going to do that at all’. We are open to every 
 patriotic Libyan who is a nationalist, who loves their country, and wants to fight 
 dictatorship in Libya. 
                                                 
33 National Front for the Salvation of Libya,  Libya Under Gaddafi and the NFSL Challenge: An Anthology of 
the NFSL Newsreport 1989-1992, 1992, 291-292.  
34 Anonymous interviewee.  
35 Anonymous interviewee. 
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Indeed, the NFSL committed:36 
 [...] to work through all sections of the Libyan nation and call for the setting-up of a 
 national, democratic and constitutional rule imbued with and inspired by, the beliefs 
 and ideas of the Libyan people and by their history, civilisation and heritage. 
The declaration and the members of the NFSL presented their nationalist project in cohesive 
terms. However, reconciling the different thick ideologies present inside the country and 
abroad, as well as the demands of the ethnic groups, Amazigh and Tebu, that have a history, 
civilisation and heritage different from the majority of the population which identifies with 
Arab ethnicity, is not a political project of easy realisation. 
 While the NFSL grew through the political, military and financial support of foreign 
governments in the 1980s, the means of communication at the time, a radio station and a bi-
monthly paper newsletter, Al Inqadh (Salvation), remained limited in their ability to reach 
Libyans across the world and inside the country. The final objective of the group was regime 
change to be achieved by military means. Although the coups d’état led by the NFSL failed or 
never materialised, they led to the establishment of Libyan opposition communities around 
the world, particularly in the US. Ultimately, the NFSL was unable to catalyse support among 
the population or within the Libyan diaspora at large and stalled and shrunk in the 1990s. This 
was at least in part due to the Gaddafi regime’s response to the growing political opposition 
abroad in the 1980s.  
 Indeed, from the very beginning, Gaddafi called for the ‘physical liquidation' of 
Libyan dissidents abroad. In 1980, ten Libyan exiles were assassinated in Europe.37 These 
events resulted in isolation and suspiciousness among Libyans abroad and in limited 
interactions and shared intents between the political exiles and Libyans in the diaspora and 
inside the country, limiting the potential cohesiveness of the NFSL’s long-distance 
nationalism vis-à-vis the diaspora and at home. Yet the project and work of the NFSL in exile 
                                                 
36 National Front for the Salvation of Libya,  Libya Under Gaddafi and the NFSL Challenge, 291-292.  
37 Yonah Alexander and Kenneth Myers, Terrorism in Europe, (London: Routledge, 2015).  
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had a great impact on the everyday lives of its members and on their long-distance everyday 
nationalism, as the next section will demonstrate.   
 The lack of interaction between the diaspora and the homeland was not limited to the 
political field but it also extended to the economic one. After 1973, the oil revenues provided 
the funds to implement a revolutionary economic plan that resulted in the elimination of the 
private sector by the end of the 1970s, making business in Libya impossible.38 As a result, 
several businessmen and doctors relocated to Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Europe and 
the US.39 Some of them engaged more or less overtly in supporting when not financing 
political opposition groups such as the NFSL.40 When in the 1980s oil prices fell and oil 
revenues plummeted, an economic crisis hit the country and the regime found itself 
economically, politically and diplomatically isolated. The imposition of economic sanctions 
on the regime led to a further flow of professionals working in the aviation and petro-
chemical sectors towards the Gulf States in the 1990s.41  
 The diaspora ranks were further expanded between the end of the 1980s and the end of 
the 1990s mainly with members of the Islamist opposition. Small groups of jihadists emerged 
in Libya in the early 1980s around religious leaders who opposed the regime. Between 800 
and 1,000 Libyan jihadists joined the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan where the 
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), known as al-Muqatila, was formed in 1990. When 
they started to return to Libya in the early 1990s, much of the leadership was forced to remain 
in exile in Afghanistan, Sudan and in the UK. Those who managed to return set up cells in 
Cyrenaica. By 1995 the LIFG had 300 members inside Libya.42 When they were discovered 
that year, the group had infiltrated the country and issued its first statement announcing its 
existence and declaring in the London based and Libya focused al-Fajr magazine that the 
                                                 
38 Vandewalle, A history of modern Libya, 106-108. 
39 Maghur, ‘Highly-skilled Migration (Libya) - Legal aspects’, 4.  
40 Anonymous interviewee. 
41 Maghur, ‘Highly-skilled Migration (Libya) - Legal aspects’, 4. 
42 Alison Pargeter, ‘Gaddafi and Political Islam in Libya’, in Libya since 1969. Gaddafi’s Revolution Revisited, 
ed. Dirk Vandewalle (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 92-97. 
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overthrow of the regime was 'the foremost duty after faith in God'.43 The regime responded 
with a brutal repression in the east of the country. By the end of the 1990s the LIFG had lost 
its base in Cyrenaica. Hundreds were jailed; several fled the country and took up residence in 
the West, especially in the UK, but also in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Sudan and 
Afghanistan.44 These militant networks were essential in mobilising fighters in 2011 among 
former members and their families.  
 Although the group officially adopted the discourse and the principles of the global 
revolutionary jihad and of the umma, ‘One Muslim Nation’,45 as Noman Benotman, a former 
member of the LIFG’s shura council, stated in a 2005 interview:46 
 The LIFG has always been wholly focused on Libya. Our ultimate objective was the 
 creation of an Islamic state in Libya. 
The LIFG can be defined as a 'country-first' jihadi group, that is a group with a nationalist 
rhetoric and commitment to nationalist politics.47 Their focus is on the establishment of 
institutions within local communities although they maintain fluid relations with the global 
Salafi-Jihadi movements.  
 With respect to the moderate Islamist opposition, the Libyan Islamic Group was 
established in the US and in the UK in 1979 as the Libyan branch of the international Muslim 
Brotherhood. Security operations against high-level Brotherhood members in Libya begun in 
the 1970s.48 This led to a first wave of members leaving Libya and to the official dismantling 
                                                 
43 Alison Pargeter, ‘Gaddafi and Political Islam in Libya’, 96-97.  
44 Maghur, ‘Highly-skilled Migration (Libya) - Legal aspects’, 4.; International Crisis Group, Popular Protest in 
North Africa and the Middle East: Making Sense of Libya, Middle East/North Africa Report N°107 – 6 June 
2011, 21. 
45 Alison Pargeter, ‘Gaddafi and Political Islam in Libya’, 95; Noman Benotman, Jason Pack and James 
Brandon, ‘Islamists’, in The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Gaddafi Future (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Camille al-Tawil, Brothers in Arms: Al-Qai’da and the Arab Jihadists (London: 
Saqi Press, 2010).  
46 Aaron Y. Zelin and Andrew Lebovich, ‘Assessing Al-Qa`ida’s Presence in the New Libya’, CTC Sentinel, 
March 2012, Volume 5, Issue 3. Available at: https://ctc.usma.edu/assessing-al-qaidas-presence-in-the-new-
libya/ (accessed on October 28, 2018).   
47 United States Institute of Peace and Wilson Centre (2017), The Jihadi Threat. ISIS, al-Qaeda and Beyond,  5-
6. Available at: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf 
(accessed on October 28, 2018). 
48 Alison Pargeter, ‘Gaddafi and Political Islam in Libya’, 86-87. 
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of the organisation inside the country.49 While the elimination of the leadership reduced the 
ability of the organisation to operate in Libya, it did not succeed in eradicating its followers 
abroad or in Libya. Indeed, as students and exiles mainly in the UK, the US and Canada, 
Libyan members of the Muslim Brotherhood developed from the 1970s onwards the network 
that is at the basis of today’s Libyan Brotherhood organisational structure.50 An internal 
power struggle emerged in the early stages of the foundation of the group. The divisions were 
linked to the establishment of the NFSL whose backbone was represented by the Libyan 
Islamic Movement of Ashur Shamis. Shamis was among the Libyan ikhwan who broke away 
from the Brotherhood to refocus its attention on Libya and on the NFSL.51 Other ikhwan 
maintained their links to the Egyptian organisation under the banner of the Libyan Islamic 
Group. The split reflected the rising tension between nationalism and Islamism at the time.   
 Although throughout the 1980s Brotherhood figures remained inside the country, due 
to the regime’s oppression of any form of civil society, the Libyan Brotherhood had no civil 
society organisations nor was it able to draw support to the movement through charitable 
work preventing it from getting a strong foothold in the country.52 When in 1998 the regime 
discovered some Brotherhood cells, it launched a mass arrest campaign that led to over one 
hundred members of the organisation detained and the rest forced to flee.53 From their main 
outposts in the UK, Switzerland, Canada, Ireland, and the United States,54 facilitated by the 
                                                 
49 Massimiliano Cricco, 'L'Islam in Libia', in Libia: Fine o Rinascita di una Nazione? (Roma: Donzelli Editore, 
2012), 52-55.  
50 Alison Pargeter, ‘Gaddafi and Political Islam in Libya’, 86; Mary Fitzgerald, ‘Finding Their Place: Libya’s 
Islamists During and After the Revolution’, in The Libyan Revolution and its Aftermath (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 178.  
51 Alison Pargeter, ‘Gaddafi and Political Islam in Libya’, 87; Benotman, Pack and Brandon, ‘Islamists’, 195-
196.  
52 Alison Pargeter, ‘Gaddafi and Political Islam in Libya’, 88-90. 
53 Alison Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood: from Opposition to Power (London: Saqi, 2013), 320-321; 
International Crisis Group, ‘Popular Protest in North Africa’, 20.  
54 Mary Fitzgerald, ‘Introducing the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood’, Foreign Policy, November 2, 2012, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/02/introducing-the-libyan-muslim-brotherhood/ (accessed July 16, 2018).  
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reach and availability of new means of communication such as the Internet and satellite TV, 
members of the Libyan Islamic Group became vocal against the regime in the early 2000s.55  
 As an Islamist movement and branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Libyan 
Islamic Group and its members understood Islam as 'the solution', an 'all-encompassing 
religion', 'a comprehensive order for human existence' that overrides foreign ideologies such 
as socialism, nationalism, communism and capitalism and provides an inclusive system that 
extends to politics, economics, society and culture, 'a program for everyday life'.56 The same 
is true with respect to the LIFG that was committed to the global jihadist ideology and to the 
belief in the jihad as the only viable tool of change.57 Therefore, both the Libyan Muslim 
Brotherhood and the LIFG, in contrast with the thin nationalism of the NFSL, embraced a 
thick ideology that provided the direction and methods to be adopted to build a political 
community according to the Islamic principles and tenets.  
 These Islamist ideologies are what determine membership to the group next to 
belonging to the Libyan nation-state. As Zubaida observed, as 'the territorial nation-state is 
the only concrete political reality - as nation and state',58 this was ultimately reflected in the 
orientation of the political activities and patterns of socialisation of the two groups in exile 
that ultimately referred to the Libyan nation-state as the defining framework of the group’s 
political initiatives and of the members’ social life. Their long-distance nationalism, therefore, 
is less cohesive compared to that of the NFSL as it is combined with a thick ideology that 
members must share to be part of the group automatically excluding those who do not.   
 Meanwhile, the non-Islamist opposition in exile convened in June 2005 the National 
Conference for the Libyan Opposition in London. The conference was an umbrella 
organisation that brought together a number of non-Islamist groups among which the NFSL, 
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the Libyan Constitutional Union and the Libyan League for Human Rights, as well as 
individuals who belonged to opposition groups by then dissolved.59 Asked about the political 
agenda of the conference, a participant responded:  
 It was purely nationalist, transcending all ideological forces, which was a sign of the 
 times because in the 1980s we were divided by ideologies. Now [in 2005] we are post 
 ideology but nationalist, definitely, one hundred percent. 
Although the interviewee does not consider nationalism as an ideology, it is exactly the nature 
of nationalism as a thin-centred ideology that allows different actors across the political 
spectrum to embrace it. As a long-distance nationalist project, the conference prioritised 
belonging to the nation over other forms of belonging, along the lines of the NFSL’s long-
distance nationalism. Yet the absence of the Islamist groups suggests that the rift between 
nationalists and Islamists was still vivid in the 2000s. Ultimately, the conference did not 
succeed in rallying the opposition to the regime behind the objectives of regime change and 
the establishment of a constitutional and democratic state.60  
 Nevertheless, the London conference was a good combination of smart use of old 
diasporic non-Islamist political networks, new technologies, the media and the regime’s 
inability to entirely control those but, nevertheless, trying to react to external threats. A 
participant described the conference in these terms:  
 Our media played on two concepts: we asked to go back to the 1951 constitution and 
 we started by singing the national anthem of 1951, and [raising] the old regime flag. 
 With our relationship and contacts with BBC and al-Jazeera, the conference appeared 
 as a conference that demanded the return to the old kingdom of Libya. That inflamed 
 the dreams of tribes and young people. Gaddafi felt the pressure and reacted in a very 
 stupid way. He started to run demonstrations on the streets in Libya condemning the 
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 London Conference and so all the people that had never heard of the London 
 Conference in Libya, heard of it. The people who never heard about the constitution 
 started to talk about the constitution. The image of the flag was everywhere in social 
 media.  
Satellite television and the Internet enhanced the interaction within the diaspora and between 
the diaspora and the Libyan people ‘at home’ through an unprecedented circulation of ideas 
and images. The conference was successful in fostering the national imaginary of the Libyan 
independence by bringing back the Kingdom’s flag and the 1951 national anthem that became 
the image and soundtrack during and after the 2011 revolution. The London Conference is 
one clear example of the ability of the opposition abroad to influence the politics of the 
homeland by penetrating Libya from outside through new technologies, forcing the regime to 
come to terms with the discourse of the opposition in exile and to open up but also to search 
for new allies.   
 Indeed, reconciling with the opposition abroad became one of the main objectives for 
Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, one of the sons of the leader that in the struggle for the succession to 
his father tried to position himself vis-à-vis the international community and the opposition 
abroad and at home. Saif al-Islam's Libya al-Ghad initiative that year came in response to the 
London Conference as an attempt to engage the country's intellectual elite, the businessmen 
and the professional community at home and in the diaspora in a process of political and 
economic reforms. He also opened a dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood in 2006 and with 
the LIFG in 2007 which in both cases resulted in the release of most members from prison 
and in some of them returning to Libya. Both organisations remained officially banned in 
Libya limiting the ability of Islamist ideology to take root beyond the intelligentsia.61 
Although these timid attempts at political reforms and reconciliation were reverted by the end 
of the 2000s, that decade left a legacy of political and civil society networks within the 
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diaspora, between the diaspora and the civil rights movement in Libya, as well as online,62 
that were mobilised in 2011.   
 By the end of the 2010s, the UN estimated that out of a national population of around 
6 million a total of 127,168 people born in Libya were living outside the country.63 Compared 
with estimates that set the number of Libyans living abroad at the end of the 1970s at about 
100,000,64 this statistics gives a sense of how the migratory phenomenon from Libya 
remained an elite phenomenon, regarding a small and select group of individuals mostly 
educated, relatively wealthy, and skilled, some of them politically invested.65 The UK is the 
country that since the 1990s has been consistently hosting the largest Libyan diaspora.66 
According to the UK 2011 census, 16,452 residents were born in Libya.67 This number is half 
the estimate provided by members of the community interviewed in 2016 who suggested that 
between 35,000 and 40,000 Libyans were living in the UK.68 Their estimate is likely to 
include the second and thirds generations born outside Libya who may still self-identify or be 
identified as Libyans but are not included in the census data as Libyans. 
 To sum up, the political opposition groups in exile maintained small networks during 
the Gaddafi regime. Their ability to have an impact on the politics of the homeland remained 
limited to failed coups d’état, violent Islamist militancy and demands for reforms and change 
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from abroad. The contribution to nation-building at home was null as the regime maintained a 
firm control over the country, its media and the public discourse on the nation. However, the 
advent of the internet and the regime's internal reshuffling in the 2000s resulted in the end of 
Libya's isolation from the world and in new opportunities for communication and 
collaboration between the diaspora and Libyans inside the country. The London Conference 
and the reconciliation between the Islamist groups and the regime were major contributions to 
the politics of the homeland that based on preexisting diasporic political networks initiated a 
process culminated in the 2011 revolution. The political projects of the opposition in the the 
diaspora cemented connectedness among political dissidents that in turn generated a strong 
sense of belonging to Libya as a nation. Although these groups shared an anti-Gaddafi and 
anti-regime attitude combined with the aspiration to return to Libya and represent it in its 
entirety, their interests and political agendas were divergent and their cooperation and 
effectiveness throughout the years precarious. Nevertheless, it was around these political 
networks that the opposition to the regime was fostered abroad until 2011 and it was on the 
basis of these networks that the diaspora mobilised in 2011.  
Life in the diaspora and the reproduction of Libyan social culture in everyday life 
The nature of the migration from Libya, whether determined by political reasons or by the 
search for better education and work opportunities, together with the persecutions and 
assassinations of political exiles by the regime had an impact on the way relational ties 
developed among individuals and communities in the diaspora. This section explores the 
micro interactional social mechanisms at work in the diaspora with a focus on the everyday 
life of individuals and how it contributed to construct a sense of belonging to the Libyan 
nation.69 When analysing the way in which Libyan social culture was reproduced in the 
diaspora two dichotomies can be drawn for the purpose of the analysis: one between political 
                                                 
69 Yves Déloye, ‘National Identity and Everyday Life’, 615-617. 
 20 
and a-political communities and the other between first generation migrants and 1.5/second 
generation migrants.70 
 To start with, the communities of political exiles tended to be small in size, 
geographically concentrated around few main cities - e.g. London, Manchester and Lexington 
(Kentucky, USA) - and mostly isolated from the a-political communities. They could reach a 
few dozens, in some cases hundreds, including men, women and children. For instance, in 
1990, after the failure of the NFSL to invade Libya from Chad, members of the group were 
evacuated and relocated with their families in Lexington, Kentucky (US), where the NFSL 
community was composed of around 200 individuals.71 The daughter of a member of the 
NFSL raised in the US observed:72  
 We did not go back for twenty-five, thirty years. We were frozen in time and because 
 we could not go back, we were always waiting for that opportunity to go back. The 
 community of  political dissidents is a very different kind of community. You know, 
 the NFSL was really a community. It was not just the main members. We had several 
 families and grew up in a very close community. 
Unable to return but always longing to return, members of the political opposition in exile and 
their families tended to congregate among themselves and to build closed communities with 
minimal interaction beyond the trusted political networks. An interviewee involved with the 
activities of the Libya Islamic Group recalled:73  
 It was tough, because of the mistrust between people. So those who were from the 
 same political view they met. And remember, there were some who were with the 
 regime and were trying to infiltrate the community and worked as spies. 
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This resulted in the establishment of small communities, disconnected by the majority of 
Libyans inside the country and in the diaspora that tended to reproduce their ideologies and 
vision of Libya in isolation, with rare exception. As suggested by another interviewee who 
spent most of his life between the US and Canada, in some cases these communities and their 
individuals 'calcified' to re-emerge in 2011 unchanged if not crystallized in their ideologies 
and beliefs.74 
 The a-political communities, those composed of individuals who left Libya in search 
of better education and work opportunities and did not engage in political activities, tended to 
develop their networks around family and friendships previously established in Libya with 
minimal interactions with the political opposition. A man raised in the UK whose family was 
not involved in the political opposition but got himself involved in the 2011 revolution, 
described the nature of his community and the relation with that of political dissidents in these 
terms:75  
 A lot of [Libyan] doctors came to the UK. Within my family, my parents’ social 
 group,  there were a lot of doctors and our family friends tended to be doctors, the 
 people we socialised with. Still, we mixed every now and then with the political 
 opponents but  not so much. 
The a-political communities and their members were keen not to jeopardise their relation with 
the homeland as they used to travel to visit families or because they depended on government-
sponsored scholarships for their income and life abroad.76 In turn, the a-political communities 
did not form the organisations and structures secretly developed by the political opposition 
abroad. Gatherings of a social and cultural nature mainly took place within the known familial 
and friendship networks.  
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 Therefore, the mistrust and suspiciousness among Libyans abroad resulted in 
relatively isolated and small networks of people tied by political ideology and/or kinship. This 
prevented the establishment of a diasporic public space where all Libyans could come 
together in the host countries to openly and freely 'imagine' their nation and discuss its 
characters collectively, something that should be facilitated by the experience of migration 
and the ability to communicate more easily and freely.77 However, in the case of Libya the 
reach of the regime went so far that Libyans in the diaspora were unable to create an all-
Libyan diasporic public space until the advent of the Internet.78  
 Nevertheless, Libyans in the diaspora from both communities developed a sense of 
belonging to the nation through micro interactional social mechanisms at work in the familial 
private space, Libyan schools and social gatherings. Indeed, while the activities and networks 
of the political opposition in exile remained the domain of the fathers, the young generations 
came in touch with and reproduced a Libyan social culture within these spaces. It was there 
that a sense of commonality based on a shared culture and blood emerged contributing to 
generate groupness in the diaspora. 
 The family is the primary space of reproduction of social culture among Libyans in the 
diaspora. It is in the family that parents narrate their memories of Libya and enact cultural 
practices related to language, gender and marriage. A woman observed in this respect:79  
 My parents, my father especially, promoted the love for the nation, an attachment for 
 the fact that this is who we are, a bond and a love for it. The story  telling, the returns 
 [to Libya], when we could, making sure that we interacted with my grandparents and 
 cousins and that they came to visit us very regularly, [all this] ensured that a bond  was 
 created and strengthened.   
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While Libyanness is an innate identifier for first generation Libyans, 1.5 and second 
generations were at the receiving end of the process and referred to their parents as their main 
source of Libyanness. A young man raised in the UK said:80  
 I consider myself a member of the Libyan nation first and foremost because of my 
 lineage, my history, the place I was born, the country that my parents are from and the 
 family hails from Libya. 
The importance of family relations, indeed, was a recurrent feature across the lives of most 
interviewees and ultimately what tied 1.5 and second generations to Libya. Moreover, Libyan 
dialect, being the language spoken within the family and the language of the 'Libyan 
memories' was described by 1.5 and second generation interviewees as what contributed to 
'instil a sense of identity and attachment to Libya'.81  
 The family is also the space where gender relations are challenged or become calcified 
reflecting the social and cultural upbringing of individuals. The daughter of a member of the 
NFSL was keen to emphasize how gender norms that she identified as proper of the 'Libyan 
patriarchal and tribal society' influenced the role of women in the Libyan diaspora 
communities. Women were excluded from politics but acted as 'social glue' within the family 
and between Libyan families.82 However, women of 1.5 and second generations today are 
challenging these gender relations particularly so during and after 2011.  
 While first generation migrants tended to bring their families with them to the host-
country, it is interesting to observe how young generations in the diaspora choose to 
reproduce Libyan family environments. Described as a way to 'maintain the community', 
intra-marriage among people of Libyan origin is a dominant practice in Libya and in the 
diaspora. A second-generation Libyan-British man stressed that:83 
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 The girl that I am married to was born and raised in the US from Libyan parents and 
 had been to Libya very few times but still I chose to go for somebody from Libyan 
 heritage because I felt that at some stage I would like to return to Libya and because I 
 have a lot in common with that person even if she was born and raised in the US. 
The opinion expressed by this young man echoes that of a Libyan Mancunian peer who 
observed:84  
 I’m 25 years old and I would like to get married to a Libyan because I am a Libyan 
 man. Actually, I don’t have a preference but we have this thing where it would be 
 more comfortable, I would say, if she were a Libyan. 
Kinship is a key determinant of people's roots and a marker of a unique Libyan culture and 
identity. The way in which 1.5 and second generation interviewees considered being of 
Libyan origin an important factor in the choice of a spouse is in itself a reflection of the 
importance of this feature for their own identity. Even young generations who spent most of 
their lives abroad and have dual citizenship, chose to comply with this long-lasting practice 
that not only is functional to reproduce the Libyan community but, in turn, solidifies the 
understanding of Libya as a nation based on ethnicity and blood, a nation that one 'naturally' 
belongs to.85 'Libyan ethnicity', in this way, is at the core of the national community and the 
main frame of reference of this ethnicity is the Libyan nation within the borders of the Libyan 
nation-state.  
 Outside the family, Libyan schools were one of the tools at parents’ disposal to 
establish and maintain a connection between their children and Libya, foster Libyan networks 
and a sense of belonging to the 'homeland'. A woman who attended the Libyan school in 
London observed:86 
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 In the Libyan school in London there were Libyans from different parts of Libya. So 
 they were from the South, from the East, from the West, and we all actually had to 
 make the different cuisines, the cooking and all that stuff, so it was kind of a united 
 presentation of whole Libya, in terms of food and traditional clothes. 
From the stories of the 1.5 and second generations, in Libyan schools ‘Libyanness’ 
overcomes other differences. Regional diversity in terms of food, music and traditional 
clothing were celebrated as part of a common Libyan heritage and tradition.87 
 Beyond Libyan schools, Libyans tended to congregate within the known social and 
political networks for gatherings such as picnics, dinners, lunches, camping, religious 
festivities and youth camps. These gatherings went beyond one’s city, region or ethnicity and 
were rather based on the trust established among people on the basis of familial and/or 
political networks. The interviewees presented these as important occasions to reproduce 
Libyan social culture in the diaspora and to strengthen a sense of community, cultural heritage 
and knowledge of Libyan history while eating Libyan food and listening to Libyan music. In 
these gatherings the political exiles flew the 1951 flag and sang the 1951 national anthem. 
While 1.5 and second generations were at the receiving end of these activities, for the parents 
the activities were a way to reproduce their culture and raise the children in a Libyan 
environment by introducing them to Libyan history, language and culture. A member of the 
NFSL recalled:88   
 So, to keep kids within a Libyan atmosphere we had a lot of socialising activities like 
 picnics and events like camps where we had regular camp activities, history sessions 
 for the younger generations, language sessions. [...] Even though we were a small 
 number there was a sense of community.  
These young generations, raised in these Libyan diasporic spaces, however, grew up in 
countries that in most cases acknowledged them citizenship rights. And yet, some observed 
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how they never fully felt considered by their fellow citizens as members of the host-country 
national community.89 A second generation Libyan Mancunian said:90  
 British people will remind you that you are not one of them. As a child I went to a 
 white school but you are not wanted, you are not 100% part of them. There are times 
 you are subtly reminded that you are not British.  
One interviewee explained that the feeling of being 'the other' and the hostility towards 
Muslims and Arabs in western countries is what explains his desire to return to Libya one 
day:91 
 I think that the level of hostility towards Arabs, Muslims, the other, in the West has 
 only really increased since, even before, September 11 but you can say that September 
 11 was the watershed moment. And so even for someone like me who has spent the 
 majority of my life here [UK], you are always going to be considered the other here.  
It is probably as a result of this that even the ones who were more critical about their right to 
define themselves as Libyans ultimately observed that their allegiance goes to Libya and even 
more so if compared with the allegiance to the host-country.92 It was this sense of loyalty, 
allegiance, and duty towards the family and the 'homeland' that motivated many of them to 
contribute to the 2011 revolution. 
 Commonality was established among Libyans in the diaspora on the basis of these 
shared social practices. Whether performed within the political communities of the Libyan 
Muslim Brotherhood or the NFSL or outside such political spaces, these social gatherings 
aimed at maintaining a sense of commonality along national lines. This is a political act that 
strengthens groupness and crystallises the sense of belonging to the Libyan nation-state as a 
frame of reference in the everyday life of individuals.  
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Conclusions 
This article unveiled the formation and evolution of the Libyan diaspora between 1969 and 
2011, its relevance for the politics of the homeland and for nation-building and for the 
mutually constitutive relationship between concepts of nation, nationalism, diaspora and 
belonging. First of all, the analysis of the political projects of the political opposition in exile 
during the Gaddafi regime demonstrated that these projects had the nation at the centre of 
their defining framework for political action. Whether cohesive and inclusive in principle 
because characterised by a thin-centred nationalism or somehow more exclusive because 
combining thicker ideologies with nationalism, these projects fostered a form of long-distance 
nationalism among those involved in the political opposition and within their political 
communities. Although these projects had little impact on the politics of the homeland and on 
nation-building ‘at home’ until the second half of the 2000s, they enhanced the connectedness 
among political dissidents within the respective groups and strengthened their sense of 
belonging to Libya as a political community.  
 Secondly, the analysis of the micro interactional social mechanisms at work in the 
diaspora suggests that belonging to Libya is primarily conceived as the result of deeply 
entrenched kinship relations developed in the family and semi-private diasporic spaces such 
as Libyan schools and social gatherings that ultimately contribute to create the idea of Libya 
as an ethnic nation composed by individuals related by blood and sharing common heritage, 
language and ancestry, therefore confirming Benedict Anderson’s hypothesis concerning the 
strengthening of ethnic identity in the diaspora. It was through these mechanisms that 
groupness and a sense of belonging to the Libyan nation developed in the diaspora together 
with a sense of loyalty, allegiance, and duty towards the family and the 'homeland'. The main 
limitation of this conception of nation, however, lays in the ability to transform it into a 
greater project of Libyan citizenship capable of cutting across ethnic, religious and 
ideological diversity. Indeed, while in the diaspora the nation is imagined as inclusive and 
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pluralistic, a community where unity overcome divisions based on ethnicity, region or city, 
the same is not necessarily the case ‘at home’.   
 Political and ideological divisions in the diaspora together with the regime's policies at 
home and persecutions abroad were overall detrimental to the establishment of an all-Libyan 
diasporic public space. The ability of the social and cultural practices described above to 
aggregate Libyans against other forms of political divisions remains doubtful. And yet, a 
sense of commonality and connectedness allowed for an emotional sense of belonging to 
Libya to emerge which can help contextualise the involvement of the diaspora in the 2011 
revolution and its aftermath for the benefit of future research while reaffirming the relevance 
of the nation-state as a locus of belonging in the twenty-first century.   
